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This issue features our regular annual evaluation
of changes in economic legislation that occurred
over the past year, and of the impact they had on
the business environment in Ukraine. The lack
of a common vision regarding public policy
in the Verkhovna Rada, and the government's
failure to provide analytical support for policy,
prevented a number of laws from being adopted
that would have been important for the business
community (e.g., the Civil Code, tax laws).
Entrepreneurs have no possibility to forecast
legislative developments, and thus are prevented
from designing or implementing their own
long'term development strategy. Among the
positive results achieved this year, we can cite
the adoption of the Land and Customs codes,
as well as improvements made to financial
and judicial legislation. 
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Overview
This issue of  POLICY STUDIES features our regular annual evaluation of changes in
economic legislation that occurred between October –November , and
of the impact they had on the business environment in Ukraine. The lack of  common
vision regarding public policy in the Verkhovna Rada, along with the government’s
failure to provide analytical support for policy, prevented a number of laws from
being adopted that would have been important for the business community (e.g.,
the Civil Code, tax laws). Entrepreneurs have no possibility to forecast legislative
developments, and thus are prevented from designing or implementing their own
long*term development strategy. Among the positive results achieved this year we
can cite the adoption of the Land and Customs codes, as well as improvements
made to financial and agricultural legislation
 For further information regarding changes in Ukraine’s economic legislation starting from , see
POLICY STUDIES, nos.  (July–August ),  (December ), and  (October ).
During October –November , the
Ukrainian government adopted inconsis'
tent normative acts in its effort to regulate
certain market relations. However, frame'
work legislation adopted under the central'
ly planned economy regime (namely, the
 Civil Code,  Punitive and Labour
Code,  Code of Labour Laws, 
Housing Code, and  Code of Admin'
istrative Offenses,  Economic Proce'
dural Code) were not superseded. The
President of Ukraine vetoed new Civil and
Economic codes, which were to be enacted
starting on  January  (see OWNERSHIP
RELATIONS). We believe it would be advisa'
ble to finalise and adopt the Economic
Code, in view of the changes narrowing the
sphere of state interference. Concurrently,
the Verkhovna Rada should focus its efforts
on elaborating and adopting a new Civil
Code.
The current outdated legislation in Ukraine
fails to rise to today’s market needs, and of'
ten contradicts new normative and legal acts.
Under such circumstances, legislative un'
certainty has increased, particularly in terms
of protecting private ownership rights; and
as a result, the risks of doing business esca'
late. Furthermore, obsolete laws stifle the
development of new financial instruments.
During this period, no systemic changes
took place in terms of legislation on corpo'
rate governance; the Verkhovna Rada has
not yet approved a new Law of Ukraine “On
joint'stock companies”. Meanwhile, only
fragmentary changes have been made to the
legislation regulating this sphere (see
OWNERSHIP RELATIONS). We believe that such
a situation is due to the fact that national
industrial and financial groups have sought
to preserve non'transparent rules, since
such conditions permit them to gain con'
trol over enterprises at a lower price.
None of the necessary legislative changes
have happened in the state property mana'
gement sector. Laws “On the management of
state property” and “On the State Property
Fund of Ukraine” have not been adopted,
even though they could perceptibly boost the
quality of state property management.
At the same time, reform of the judiciary has
been undertaken; on  February , the
Verkhovna Rada adopted a new Law of Ukraine
“On the judiciary in Ukraine”, which super'
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seded the laws “On the judiciary”, “On com'
mercial courts”, and “On bodies of judicial self'
government” (see JUDICIAL REFORM). The law
sets forth the legal frameworks to organise judi'
cial bodies and administer justice; boosts the
specialisation of courts and judges, which will
provide for the more competent review of
cases; and regulates the procedures for support'
ing court activities, which will give them more
independence and thus enhance the protec'
tion of entrepreneurs’ rights. However, the ef'
fects of these judicial reforms will only be re'
vealed with time.
Tax system reform in Ukraine was cramped
by the opposition between taxpayer and
government interests; businessmen first of
all seek to alleviate their tax burden, while
the government endeavours to keep bud'
get revenues from any sizable shrinking (see
TAX POLICY). The Verkhovna Rada failed to
pass the Tax Code; instead, certain tax laws
were considered, with the Law of Ukraine
“On the corporate profit tax” amended (the
tax rate was cut, depreciation norms raised,
and administration simplified) and the ex'
cise rate for certain commodities raised.
Table . Summary evaluation of changes in Ukrainian economic
legislation
Source: International Centre for Policy Studies.
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However, the effects from these changes will
be felt no earlier than . In November
, the process of amending legislation
on personal income taxation was initiated—
the Verkhovna Rada passed in first reading
a relevant law envisaging mitigation of the
tax burden upon Ukrainians.
The government’s policy aiming to support
entrepreneurship was for the most part de'
clarative (see REGULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVI*
TY). The number of adopted normative and
legal acts that would simplify the regulation
of entrepreneurial activity was insufficient.
In the meantime, administrative and nor'
mative pressure upon entrepreneurs has
hardly abated. We believe that the excessive
number of normative and legal acts passed
every year is the virtual equivalent of an
administrative tax on business, since they
consume extra time and money of entrepre'
neurs in their efforts to track all the changes
in the legal domain. Intricate and frequent
changes in the legal domain are one of the
key problems for doing business in Ukraine.
The Verkhovna Rada and Cabinet of Minis'
ters of Ukraine hardly undertook any measu'
res to adjust Ukrainian legislation to the
norms of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO; see OPEN ECONOMY). The chief accom'
plishments became the adoption of the new
Customs Code, the Law of Ukraine “On the
particulars of state regulation of economic
entities’ activity related to the production,
export, import of CDs for laser data'reading
systems”, and amendments to the Law of
Ukraine “On the quality and safety of food'
stuffs and food raw material”. Furthermore,
in its desire to tighten protectionism of the
national automobile and ferrous metallurgy
industries, the Verkhovna Rada adopted laws
contradictory to WTO norms. We believe that
this was possible due to () the disinterest of
influential stakeholders in acceding to this
organisation; and () the lack of a mechanism
for monitoring conformity of draft laws and
governmental decisions to WTO norms.
A positive achievement of the market’s open'
ness to labour migration became the lifting
of all restrictions on employment terms for
foreigners and stateless individuals in
Ukraine. On the other hand, an earlier de'
cision of the Constitutional Court regarding
changes to the requirement of registering/
terminating the domestic residence permit—
i.e., from “by permission” to “optional/
voluntary”—has remained only declara'
tive, since Ukrainians are still asked to show
a stamp in their passport indicating per'
manent residence when concluding acts of
civil registry.
The most important legislative changes in the
financial sector had to do with the regulation
of activity of non'banking institutions (see FI*
NANCIAL SECTOR). During this period, the
Verkhovna Rada passed the following key
laws: “On credit unions” and ”On amending
the Law of Ukraine ‘On insurance’”. None'
theless, delaying the creation of the State
Commission on Financial Services Market
Regulation has stifled the development of
the non'banking financial sector.
In addition, the Ukrainian government un'
dertook measures to cope more efficiently
with money laundering; the Verkhovna Rada
adopted the Law of Ukraine “On the pre'
vention and counteraction of legalisation
(laundering) of incomes acquired by crimi'
nal means”, while the NBU tightened its
control over foreign subsidiaries of Ukraini'
an banks. However, despite the measures
undertaken, the FATF classified Ukraine as
 Over three thousand laws, Presidential decrees, and governmental resolutions alone are adopted
annually. There are even more normative and legal documents of departments and local government
bodies.
 See the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated  November  regarding the
compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of the provision of sub'clause  of clause 
of the Provision on the passport authority of the internal affairs institutions.
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a country not cooperating in combating
money laundering.
During October –November , the
Land Code was a hugely important legisla'
tive act in agriculture approved by the
Verkhovna Rada (see AGRICULTURE). Its adop'
tion heralds the creation of a new free land
market, which will transform land into capi'
tal. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian government
has still to promulgate a great number of
normative and legal acts required by the
code; this makes it highly unlikely that a free
land market will emerge before .
The Ukrainian government resorted to a
number of measures to support agriculture
during the evaluated period, including the
introduction of obligatory crop insurance.
We disapprove of this measure, since we be'
lieve that it discourages enterprises from in'
dependently diversifying risks and can un'
reasonably drive up their expenses. Another
mechanism introduced to support grain
prices at a stable level was pledged and in'
terventionary purchases. However, given
that the budget does not allocate any money
to finance these mechanisms, they are only
declarative at this point.
Major problems in the communications sec'
tor include the lack of mechanisms to fi'
nance social needs and non'regulated in'
teraction between operators (see COMMUNI*
CATIONS). Postponing the resolution of these
problems will result in: () escalating oppo'
sition between the Ukrtelekom OJSC and
private operators; and () a sluggish pace
for the development of the telecommunica'
tions network and telephone penetration
level. Therefore, all market participants
should be interested in the adoption of a
new Law of Ukraine “On telecommunica'
tions”. Indeed, the Verkhovna Rada has re'
gistered such a draft, which entails its at'
tempt to adjust the activity of this correspon'
ding sector in Ukraine to comply with Euro'
pean Union directives. However, vaguely de'
fined norms of the draft can spawn rent seek'
ing and increase providers’ operating costs,
as well as administration expenses on the
part of the government.
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Ownership relations
Over October –November , no systemic changes occurred in legislation
on corporate governance due to the Verkhovna Rada’s failure to pass a new Law of
Ukraine “On joint*stock companies”, legislation regulating this sphere underwent
only fragmentary changes. The situation was similar in the state property
management sector, with no adoption of the laws “On the management of objects of
state ownership” and “On the State Property Fund of Ukraine”, which could have
boosted the quality of state property management significantly. The President of
Ukraine vetoed new Civil and Economic codes, which were to come into effect
starting on  January . We believe it would not be expedient to revise or
adopt the Economic Code, given that the scope of state interference has been
narrowed. At the same time, the Verkhovna Rada should focus its efforts on revising
and adopting a new version of the Civil Code
Corporate governance
Over October –November , the
Verkhovna Rada made only fragmentary
changes to legislation on corporate govern'
ance, which were induced by the crucial
need to adjust certain legislative norms to
accepted corporate relations practice. The
main laws adopted by the parliament during
the research period were the laws dated
 March  “On amending the Law of
Ukraine ‘On restoring debtors’ solvency or
declaring them bankrupt’” and “On amend'
ing the Law of Ukraine ‘On companies’”.
These documents () eliminated the una'
nimity requirement during voting, replac'
ing it with simple'majority voting; and
() banned the holding shareholders’ meet'
ings abroad, with the exception being if all
shareholders are non'residents.
However, no systemic changes were under'
taken in corporate governance legislation
that might allow to do away with the incon'
sistencies between different laws; sympto'
matically, a new Law of Ukraine “On joint'
stock companies” was not approved. We be'
lieve that this situation was due to the ten'
dency of national industrial and financial
groups to stick to non'transparent rules,
since that gives them the chance to gain con'
trol over enterprises at a lower price.
The Decree of the President of Ukraine
dated  March  “On measures to de'
velop corporate governance in joint'stock
companies” sets forth the following radical
changes in corporate governance legislation:
 establishing a cumulative voting proce'
dure in the course of forming superviso'
ry boards;
 determining cases of mandatory buyouts
of shareholders’ stakes by companies at
market prices;
 introducing mandatory notification of in'
tent to purchase controlling share pack'
ages of corresponding companies and
determining the procedure for issuing
such a notification;
 This explains low domestic demand for shares of national enterprises, with low liquidity of the stock fund
being the proof.
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 establishing administrative responsibili%
ty of company officials for violating share%
holders’ rights.
We assume that the process of adopting
necessary legislation will galvanise as the
 presidential elections approach, prior
to which financial and industrial groups will
seek to legislatively shield their ownership
rights in order to insure themselves against
undesirable implications in case of proper%
ty re%distribution.
Civil Code
In Ukraine, the Civil Code adopted back in
 is still in effect. Its norms do not fit
market economy conditions, because it does
not take into account the rights of private
business. The issue of forming and function%
ing of private enterprises has been regula%
ted by other normative documents, particu%
larly the laws “On property” and “On enter%
prises in Ukraine”. Nonetheless, when con%
sidering cases courts continue to be guided
by the provisions of the passé Civil Code,
which hampers the effective protection of
private ownership rights.
On  November , the Verkhovna Rada
passed at one sitting the Civil and Economic
codes. Under the laws promulgating them,
both codes were to come into effect starting
on  January . However, the President
of Ukraine vetoed them and insisted on a
more thorough elaboration of both docu%
ments, and an incorporation of his propo%
sals.
The President believes that the key obsta%
cles to enforcing the Economic and Civil
codes are the following:
 The Civil and Economic codes have cer%
tain regulation issues in common, but
their ways of regulating the same rela%
tions differ;
 Norms of both codes contradict the Con%
stitution of Ukraine.
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE CIVIL AND ECONO
MIC CODES. The objects of regulation by the
Civil Code are personal non%property and
property relations. The norms of the Civil
Code should be applied to legal entities of
both private law and public law, if they enter
into civil relations. Therefore, the Civil Code
does not regulate relations within public law
(particularly those grounded upon admini%
strative or other authoritative subordination
of one party to another). The Economic
How to prevent obstacles to the activities of jointstock companies
The Supreme Court of Ukraine and the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine are guided by various
legislative acts on corporate governance in jointstock companies. The Supreme Court is governed mostly
by the general legislation, such as the obsolete Civil Code, and disregards normative acts more in keeping
with the situation in the market (especially those adopted by the State Commission on Securities and the
Stock Market). Given the failure of the judicial system to achieve sufficient independence and lack of bias
(see JUDICIAL REFORM), it is getting possible for certain shareholders to block decisions of jointstock
companies by certain shareholders, based on the following scheme: the covert claimant () finds an
individual residing in a district where the local court is “on side”; () helps him/her to become a petty
shareholder; () directs this shareholder to file a claim prepared by the lawyers of the covert claimant (the
cost of  the claim is only . UAH); and () the court makes the required ruling (more rarely, a decision).
We believe that in order to prevent the activities of jointstock companies from being blocked, the primary
task should be to increase the independence of the judicial system and raise the level of court specialisa
tion (see JUDICIAL REFORM).
 Such a scheme is most frequently used when it is needed to arrest property or some amount of money,
or to disrupt shareholders’ meetings  (e.g., to block decisions about extra issues of shares). Over the
evaluated period, such schemes were especially practiced by the Darnytsia CJSC in its conflict with the
Borschahivsky Chemical and Pharmaceutical Plant JSC.
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Code regulates economic relations arising
when organising and conducting economic
activity between economic agents, as well as
between these agents and other parties in'
volved in the economic sphere. Thus, the
Economic Code regulates both public'law
and private'law relations.
Concurrently, both codes, as already men'
tioned, regulate the same relations in a dif'
ferent fashion. For instance, they give dif'
ferent classifications of entrepreneurial en'
tities and envisage different procedures for
their creation.
Thus, the simultaneous promulgation of
both codes will give rise to a great number
of legal collisions, which will obstruct the
work of government bodies and courts, and
will significantly increase enterprises’ ope'
rating costs. What is more, the Economic
Code incorporates a number of norms con'
tradicting extant legislation—that is, norms
on the protection of economic competition
(regulated by the Law of Ukraine “On the
protection of economic competition”), and
on the regulation of land and budget rela'
tions (regulated by the Land and Budget
codes).
INCONSISTENCY OF CODE NORMS WITH THE CON*
STITUTION OF UKRAINE. According to the
President, incongruity of the Economic
Code with constitutional norms exists in the
following areas:
 The Economic Code regulates those rela'
tions which according to the Constitution
should be guided solely by laws of
Ukraine, including the designation of
spheres of state regulation and lists of
types of activity/entrepreneurship where
competition rules and norms of antimo'
nopoly regulation are not applied;
 Classifies the Cabinet of Ministers, minis'
tries, and other governmental bodies and
organisations as management bodies of
the state sector of the economy, while in
the Constitution only the Cabinet of Mini'
sters falls under this category;
 Contrary to the Constitution, it does not
permit appeals against the actions or
negligence of government and local self'
government bodies;
 Envisages that communal property is to
be managed by local self'government
bodies. At the same time, the Constitu'
tion stipulates that territorial communi'
ties are to be in charge, either directly or
through established local self'govern'
ment bodies.
As for the Civil Code, the President focuses
attention to the following key areas of its in'
consistency with the Constitution of
Ukraine:
 The code restrains the President’s con'
stitutional authorities, particularly the
right to limit human rights and freedoms
in emergency situations, and the right
to issue decrees and directives;
 Contradictions over ownership rights of
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,
with the code stipulating the ownership
rights of the republic, while the Consti'
tution defines only the right to manage
property belonging to the republic.
We consider the elaboration and adoption
of the Economic Code to be inexpedient, in
view of the scope of state interference hav'
ing been narrowed. Under the market eco'
nomy, only a limited number of oblasts re'
main that necessitate state interference in
enterprise activities, as follows:
 regulation of natural monopolies (ener'
gy sector, railway transport, housing and
public utilities, and communications);
 protection of economic competition and
prevention of abuses of monopoly status;
 guaranteed safety of consumption and
effective allocation of limited natural re'
sources (licensing, standardisation, cer'
tification);
 environmental protection.
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State property management
The overriding problem in state property
management in Ukraine is low management
performance, due to feeble incentives for
state managers to efficiently perform their
duties. Over October –November ,
the Verkhovna Rada failed to pass the laws of
Ukraine “On the management of state
property objects” and “On the State Property
Fund of Ukraine”, which could substantially
boost the quality of management. Currently,
the SPFU continues to operate on obsolete
legal foundations dating to –,
where its authorities are vaguely defined.
Meanwhile, government policy in the state
management sphere boiled down to perform'
ing minor legislative changes over the re'
search period. In particular, on  November
 the President issued the Decree “On
immediate measures to regulate the activity
of state (national) joint'stock and holding
companies”, which proved almost fruitless.
Among its positive achievements, it is only to
mention the prohibition on alienating shares
transferred to share capital, the liquidation
of the Credit and Guarantee Institution, and
the limitation of operations by state'control'
led enterprises involving bills of exchange
(however, enterprises of the oil'and'gas com'
plex and electricity enterprises were left out
of its purview).
Furthermore, the process of state property
management remained behind an informa'
tional screen. An example of non'transpar'
ent state property management policy is the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolution
dated  March  “On the transfer of
 percent of shares of the Komsomolske
Rudoupravlinnia open joint'stock company,
which is a part of the share capital of the
Ukrrudprom State Joint'Stock Company, to
the management of the Mariupol Illich Me'
tallurgical Works open joint'stock company”.
The transfer was performed non'competi'
tively.
In addition, over the research period, the
post'privatisation sale took place of energy'
generating companies, ore refineries, an oil
export terminal, and a tyre'manufacturing
enterprise. The Verkhovna Rada adopted
the Law of Ukraine dated  November 
“On declaring a moratorium on forced pro'
perty sales”, prohibiting the alienation of
state property and state corporate rights in
exchange for outstanding debts. However,
we believe that this Law does not resolve
the problem of low management perform'
ance, since it: () reduces the responsibility
of managers of state'controlled enterprises
and heaps more debts upon many enterpris'
es; () creates unequal conditions for entre'
preneurial activity; and () limits the possi'
bilities of state enterprises to obtain loans.
Most Ukrainian enterprises were privatised
in the year —only enterprises of infra'
We believe that in order to regulate these are'
as, it would be sufficient to adopt specific laws,
some of which have already been enacted in
Ukraine. Relations between the government
and state'owned enterprises should be go'
verned by corporate governance mechanisms
(charter approval, appointment of managers,
reporting procedures for managers).
At the same time, we believe that the Verkhov'
na Rada should focus its efforts on revising
and adopting the Civil Code. This will allow
the further development of Ukraine’s le'
gislation, and the adoption of the laws of
Ukraine “On joint'stock companies” and “On
securities and the stock exchange”. The im'
plementation of a new Civil Code is expec'
ted to ameliorate the investment climate in
Ukraine and boost the protection of private
ownership rights.
 See the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic resolution dated  August 
“Concerning the State Property Fund of the Ukrainian SSR” and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
Resolution dated  July  “On the Temporary Regulations on the State Property Fund of Ukraine”.
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structure sectors remained state'owned. The
sales of energy'distributing enterprises in
April  testified once more that the priva'
tisation of infrastructure enterprises demands
far greater efforts in view of the need to dis'
tinguish between the social and commercial
functions of such enterprises, as well as to
establish market regulations in these sectors.
We are of the opinion that government poli'
cy regarding infrastructure enterprises
should strive to achieve the following goals:
 to clearly distinguish between the social
and commercial functions of said enter'
prises;
 to organise commercial activity so as to
maximise profits, and to adopt the best
practices and organisational structures in
order to accomplish this goal;
 to find a viable mechanism for financing
social goals and controlling their accom'
plishment;
 to supply the necessary funds for new
investments;
 to ensure the largest possible revenues
to the budget from said enterprises.
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Judicial reform
The second step in the reform of the judicial system  was approved with the passage
of the  February  Law of Ukraine “On the judiciary of Ukraine”, which replaced
a number of old laws. The law sets forth legal principles for the organisation of the
judicial bodies and for the administration of justice; boosts specialisation of judges
and court, which will allow to consider cases more competently; regulates the
procedures for supporting judges’ activities, which will make them more independent
In any country, effective protection of the
interests of enterprises and organisations is
impossible without an effective judicial sys'
tem. A judicial system can be considered
effective if it is capable of settling any dis'
pute between economic entities or other
parties professionally and without bias over
a short period of time.
Currently, Ukraine’s judicial system is under'
going reforms. The second step in the reform
of the judicial system was the approval on
 February  of a new Law of Ukraine “On
the judiciary of Ukraine”, which replaced a
number of laws, namely, “On the judiciary”,
“On commercial courts”, “On bodies of judi'
cial self'government”, and “On qualificatory
committees, qualificatory attestation, and dis'
ciplinary responsibility of judges of courts of
Ukraine”. The new law regulates the follow'
ing key issues pertaining to the functioning
of Ukraine’s judicial system:
 establishes the legal principles for the
organisation of the judicial arm of go'
vernment and for the administration of
justice;
 establishes the system of courts of gene'
ral jurisdiction;
 sets requirements for forming a body of
professional judges, public assessors,
and juries;
 regulates the procedure for exercising
judicial self'government and ensuring
the proper functioning of courts.
Courts of general jurisdiction
According to the law, Ukraine’s judicial sys'
tem is composed of courts of general juris'
diction and the Constitution Court of
Ukraine. The courts of general jurisdiction
are the following: local courts; courts of ap'
peal; the Appeal Court of Ukraine; the Cas'
sation Court of Ukraine; higher specialised
courts; and the Supreme Court of Ukraine.
 At the first stage of the judicial reform, the Verkhovna Rada approved in June–July  amendments
to the Laws of Ukraine “On the judiciary”, “On the status of judges”, “On bodies of judicial self'govern'
ment”, “On the public prosecutor’s office”, “On the arbitration court”, and “On the militia”, as well as
amended the procedural codes. For the evaluation of these legislative changes, see POLICY STUDIES, No. 
(October ), p. '.
 Under the law the Appeal and Cassation Courts of Ukraine had to be formed till  August .
However, this was done only on  October  by the Presidential Decree of Ukraine “On the Appeal
Court of Ukraine, the Cassation Court of Ukraine, and the Supreme Administrative Court of Ukraine.”
Appeal and Cassation courts
The Appeal and Cassation courts are new to
Ukraine’s judicial system. They have been
created in order to ensure proper fulfilment
of citizens’ rights to file appeals and cassa'
tion claims regarding court judgements.
However, these courts are not working in
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 Excluding the Supreme Court of Ukraine, the Constitution Court of Ukraine, and high specialised
courts.
Public assessors and juries
In order to comply with the requirements
of the Constitution of Ukraine on ensuring
the direct participation of the public'at'large
in administering justice, the Law of Ukraine
“On the judiciary of Ukraine” stipulated re'
quirements regarding public assessors and
juries, the procedure for their involvement
in administering justice, as well as their
rights and a guarantee of their protection.
Public assessors are to be involved, and ju'
ries formed, in the consideration of court
cases determined by the procedural law.
However, currently only the Criminal and
Procedural Code envisages the involve'
ment of public assessors to consider court
cases, whereas the formation of juries is not
envisaged by any procedural law. In order
to ensure the effective introduction of the
institution of public assessors and juries,
new procedural codes will have to be adop'
ted, or amendments entered into extant
codes.
Ensuring proper functioning of the courts
The Law of Ukraine “On the judiciary of
Ukraine” reforms the system of supporting
court activity, with the following new fea'
tures:
 a separate expenditures item in the State
Budget to finance the courts to at least a
minimum level ensuring the full and in'
dependent administration of justice, in
accordance with the law;
 legislative guarantees of full and timely
financing of the courts;
 guarantees of an appropriate level of so'
cial security for judges.
The National Court Administration, estab'
lished by the Decree of the President dated
 August  “On the National Court Ad'
ministration”, ensures the organisational
support for court activities, and as of  it
will be in charge of allocating State Budget
funds earmarked to financially support the
activities of all courts of general jurisdic'
tion, as well as the activities of expert com'
mittees of the courts of all levels, bodies of
full capacity yet, due to the lack of necessary
legislative acts; in particular, it has still not
been determined what cases exactly are to
be under the jurisdiction of the Appeal and
Cassation courts of Ukraine.
Specialisation of courts and
judges
Innovations brought by the Law of Ukraine
“On the judiciary of Ukraine” in the domain
of specialisation of courts and judges are the
following:
 Establishment of specialised administra'
tive courts. However, the categories of
cases to be under the jurisdiction of these
courts has not been determined yet. Gi'
ven that three years were allotted to form
the administrative court system, we ex'
pect that it will be fully formed no earli'
er than early ;
 Introduction of judge specialisation for
the consideration of specific categories
of cases.
We believe that specialisation in a specific
category of cases (e.g., consideration of dis'
putes between taxpayers and tax agencies,
bankruptcy cases) allows judges to learn
more profoundly and in more detail all le'
gislative the nuances associated with such
cases, and thus to perform their duties more
competently.
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judicial self'government, and the state judi'
cial administration.
The National Court Administration per'
forms no regulatory functions, nor creates
or manages state enterprises—unlike the
Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, which had
heretofore been providing organisational,
material, and financial support for court ac'
tivities. Therefore, conflicts of interest in the
National Court Administration should not
arise in the process of supporting court ac'
tivities. Given the above, we believe that the
new procedure for supporting court activi'
ties should promote the independence and
impartiality of the judicial arm of govern'
ment.
Nevertheless, the lack of criteria for deter'
mining the proper level of financing for the
courts and the responsibility for delayed or
incomplete financing reduces the probabili'
ty that requirements for supporting the
courts will be fulfilled.
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Tax Policy
Over October –November , no dramatic changes occurred in tax
legislation. The key obstacle to consistent reforms in the tax system is the lack of
compromise between taxpayers and the government, with business seeking above
all to mitigate their tax burden while the government seeks to prevent the significant
curtailment of budget revenues. A consensus was reached only regarding changes
in the corporate profit tax approved in December 
Corporate profit tax
 According to the results of an enterprise opinion poll conducted by the International Finance Corpo'
ration in , the biggest problems with the taxation system were named by entrepreneurs as the size of
tax rates, shaky tax legislation, and the number of taxes.
 According to a survey conducted by ICPS experts, the tax reductions envisaged in the last version of the
Tax Code, would bring GDP growth up by only . percentage points (all other conditions being equal).
For more details on the survey, see QUARTERLY PREDICTIONS, No.  (October ), p. –.
 That is, the so'called “dual'purpose” expenditures, such as expenses on fuel and oil materials, car rent, etc.
 In accordance with an enterprise survey conducted by the International Finance Corporation in ,
the corporate profit tax makes strategic planning and reporting more difficult, compared to other taxes.
Despite the fact that tax reform in Ukraine
has been debated over four years, no cohe'
rent regulation in this sphere has been
achieved so far. Due to the lack of radical
legislative changes, the non'reformed tax
system has become a serious factor curbing
economic growth in Ukraine.
We believe that the major obstacle to mean'
ingful tax system reform is the lack of a com'
promise between taxpayers and the govern'
ment, with business seeking above all to miti'
gate their tax burden while the government
seeks to prevent the significant curtailment
of budget revenues. In our opinion, if there
is no substantial cut in the effective tax rate,
any changes in the tax system will not no'
ticeably stir up economic growth. There'
fore, of the two alternatives of either dra'
matically curtailing the tax rate or preserv'
ing budget revenues, it would be expedi'
ent to opt for the first option and trim cur'
rent budget spending.
An example of the incompatibility of govern'
ment and business positions in Ukraine is
well illustrated by the history of corporate
profit tax reform.
In our opinion, this tax does require reform,
in view of the following factors:
 The high tax rate, together with high
business risks, makes long'term invest'
ments unprofitable;
 Low norms for depreciation deductions
hamper investments, since they envisage
unrealistically long terms for the usage
of capital assets. Tax pressure is also in'
tensified by the ban on deducting cer'
tain groups of expenditures from aggre'
gate income when paying taxes;
 The necessity of making monthly advance
payments raises high, non'productive ex'
penditures on accounting and compli'
cates the planning of financial flows.
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The differences in positions of the executive
government and the Verkhovna Rada on cor'
porate profit tax reform is given in Table .
In our opinion, the draft by MPs will have a
more encouraging effect on the business
environment compared to that of the exe'
cutive government. We ground our assump'
tions upon the following flaws of the cabi'
net draft:
 Significantly limited possibilities for the
transfer of losses compared to the extant
rules, as proposed by the government
executive, would deteriorate the invest'
ment climate. Transferring the losses to
future periods allows () to ensure the
neutrality of the tax system in terms of
business risks (investment, political,
etc.), and () to automatically mitigate
the tax burden during cyclic downfalls
of the economy;
 The decision to apply ordinary prices to
all enterprise operations, proposed by
the executive government, would lead
Table . Divergence of opinion on corporate profit tax reform
Source: International Centre for Policy Studies.
 Under extant legislation, “ordinary price is the sale price for goods (works, services) of the seller,
including the sum of accrued (paid) interest, and the cost of foreign currency that can be obtained if it
is sold to individuals not related to the seller under ordinary terms of economic activity”. See the Law of
Ukraine dated  May  “On the corporate profit tax”.
 That is, buildings and constructions of  the main pipeline transport, buildings and constructions of
communications and transmission lines, devices of electricity supply/distribution, vessels, railway locomo'
tives and carriages, aerial and spacecrafts.
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to unjustified interference in the activi'
ties of economic entities. Firstly, even the
most exhaustive definition of ordinary
prices would not cover all aspects of en'
terprise activity and price policy. Second'
ly, the large'scale practice of ordinary
prices would not be an effective way of
preventing tax evasion, due to the over'
ly high expenditures that would be re'
quire to monitor prices and check all
enterprise transactions;
 In accordance with the procedure pro'
posed by the executive government,
monthly advance payments would, in fact,
be simpler than the current procedure.
However, it contains significant draw'
backs compared to the quarterly tax pay'
ments: () the procedure disregards the
seasonal aspect of business activity, and
() its usage would inevitably increase the
tax pressure upon enterprises during cy'
clical downturns of business activity.
Ultimately, parties have found middle
ground: on  December the Verkhovna
Rada adopted the Law “On amending the
Law of Ukraine ‘On the corporate profit
tax’”, which envisages to implement the key
MPs’ proposals and measures, which will
prevent State Budget revenues from shrink'
ing dramatically over . In general,
changes envisaged in the law will positively
affect business activity. These changes are
as follows:
 The tax rate reduction by  percentage
points to %, which will take place in
;
  more groups of capital assets and %
increase in depreciation norms. Simul'
taneously, changes pertaining to the nd
and rd groups of capital assets will come
into effect in early ;
 Elimination of limitations on loss trans'
fer, accumulated from the enactment of
this law, to future periods. Losses piled
up hitherto will be deducted from the
non'taxed profit only over three years
from their accumulation;
 Abolishment of monthly advance pay'
ments and adoption of quarterly tax pay'
ments. In order to stabilise budget reve'
nues over the next year, enterprises
should make advance tax payments for
January and also for eleven months.
Personal income tax
Personal income tax in Ukraine is expected
to undergo the most radical changes in the
course of tax reform. We see the following
problems in the extant tax system:
 The high rate of personal income tax
and payments to obligatory general so'
cial insurance funds drive up the cost
of labour for business, with enterprises
in labour'intensive sectors suffering the
most from the high rate, primarily those
with a high share of expenses on skilled
employees;
 Tight tax pressure reduces savings pos'
sibilities, and thus stifles the develop'
ment of small' and medium'sized busi'
nesses, for which access to lending mar'
kets is limited compared to big enterpri'
ses;
 The current system of tax administration
imposes unproductive expenditures on
both taxpayers and the State Tax Admi'
nistration (STA).
On  November , the Verkhovna Rada
adopted in first reading the draft Law of
Ukraine “On the personal income tax” ta'
bled by the MPs. We believe that if adopted,
this law would encourage economic growth,
thanks to a sizable decrease in the tax bur'
den upon both taxpayers and employers.
The draft law envisages implementing the
following changes:
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 A dramatic cut in tax rates, particularly
for the middle class, and a decrease in
the cost of labour, thanks to a reduced
payroll tax;
 A decrease of gross revenues for certain
expenditures—specifically, expenditures
on education, medical services, mortgage
interest, non'state pension insurance,
and leased immovable property mainte'
nance. The proposed system will allow
to drive the tax burden down even fur'
ther, as well as encourage citizens to in'
vest in education, healthcare, and immov'
able property. This decision is more con'
venient for high'income individuals, who
have more investment possibilities;
 Expansion of the tax base by taxing in'
terest on deposits (at %) and proceeds
from the sale of immovable property
(net of documented expenditures for
its purchase). These changes will above
all ensure taxpayers’ equality, where
incomes are liable to taxation regardless
of their source. At the same, the taxa'
tion of nominal deposit interest will ac'
tually be the same as taxing part of the
main deposit sum. In order to avoid dou'
ble taxation of incomes, it is necessary
 According to research carried out by ICPS experts on the basis of the data from monthly surveys
conducted by the GfK'USM company over –, one of the features putting respondents in Ukraine’s
middle class is a monthly income exceeding  UAH. For more details on ICPS’ research on the middle
class, see QUARTERLY PREDICTIONS, No.  (October ), p. –. Currently, citizens earning  UAH pay
% of their income as personal income tax, while a new tax scale would allow paying only %.
 Under the draft law, the base for insurance deductions envisaged in the legislation on the obligatory
state social insurance, cannot exceed , UAH. In line with the extant legislation, the base for deduct'
ing insurance payments cannot exceed , UAH.
 The amount of these expenditures cannot exceed the annual income declared by taxpayers; and
maintenance expenditures on leased immovable property should not exceed % of the income from
this type of activity.
Mandatory state insurance
Over October –November , the tax burden pressed more heavily upon enterprises, because more
levies to state insurance funds were imposed. Pursuant to a Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolution
dated  April , the maximum amount of payments to employees, from whom enterprises are
obliged to deduct levies to mandatory insurance funds, increased from , to , hryvnias. This
resolution testifies to the instability of tax policy and contradicts the norm of the Law of Ukraine “On
the taxation system”, which stipulates that changes in tax and levy collecting mechanisms are permit+
ted only at the level of laws.
Furthermore, during this year the Verkhovna Rada adopted normative documents in first reading that
dramatically changed the state insurance system:
 draft Law of Ukraine “On mandatory state pension insurance”;
 draft Law of Ukraine “On mandatory state medical insurance”.
Both draft laws envisage that the amounts of insurance payments are to be set annually by the Verkhovna
Rada, based on the financial needs of corresponding bodies in charge of money allocation. We believe that
given Ukraine’s non+reformed pension and healthcare systems, such a decision will:
() unjustifiably increase the instability of the tax system, thus having utterly unfavourable implications
for investment; and () not create any incentives for effective spending by the corresponding funds.
We believe that the state insurance system demands reforms, above all in order to achieve stability in the
amounts of levies and to reduce the administrative expenditures of enterprises. One option for eliminat+
ing flaws in the extant system can be to introduce a single social tax.
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Value'added tax
Over recent years, this tax provoked the
most critisism, from both business represen'
tatives and the government. We see the fol'
lowing as being the biggest problems related
to this tax:
 Debts on VAT reimbursements keep on
accumulating, induced by: () weak
mechanisms for controlling and prevent'
ing abuse by both taxpayers and the STA;
and () vague legislation. The problem
is that the existing definition of export
operations leaves room for ambiguous in'
terpretation; in particular, it gives
grounds not to regard deliveries under
CIF, FOB, etc. as exports. Under such
circumstances, the competitiveness of
Ukrainian exports weakens, and business
risks shoot up;
 Significant narrowing of the tax base
since the tax was introduced, in the wake
of more benefits extended. In particu'
lar, this applies to the privileged tax re'
gime in agriculture and the annual rise
in the number of benefits in special eco'
nomic zones (SEZ) and priority develop'
ment territories (PDT);
Over the past year, government activities
were more like “fire'fighting” than focussed
on resolving long'term problems. Here, we
see the following problems:
 In the wake of a drawn'out conflict with
business representatives, the STA recog'
nised deliveries under CIF, FOB, etc. as
exports. However, the Law of Ukraine
dated  April  “On the value'added
tax” underwent no changes to try and
eliminate any possibility of ambiguous in'
terpretation of the “export transaction”
definition, depending on what party
transports goods across the border (buy'
er, seller, or an unrelated third party). This
creates prerequisites for future conflicts;
 The government made no decisions in
terms of paying out accumulated VAT re'
fund debts. Meanwhile, the government
wrote off the debts of enterprises that
were entitled to tax debt write'offs in
, and effected mutual write'offs
with enterprises that received state'se'
cured credits and budget loans. The fact
that undecided issues remain creates
prerequisites for further use of mutual
 According to the results of a business opinion poll conducted by the International Finance Corporation
in , all managers, regardless of enterprise size or status, unanimously agreed that the extant system of
VAT accruals and payments, along with the refund system, poses the biggest problem for their businesses.
 That is, the expansion of SEZ and PDT territories, a wider list of types of activity, and relaxed require'
ments as to investment volumes which should be injected in order to receive the benefits. For example
the Law of Ukraine dated  February  “On amending certain laws of Ukraine regarding the creation
and functioning of special (free) economic zones and the implementation of special regimes of invest'
ment activity in priority development territories”.
  See the order of the State Tax Administration of Ukraine dated  September  “On approving the
tax explanation regarding the procedure for applying a zero'rate value'added tax to goods exported
across the customs border of Ukraine”.
 See the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolution dated  March  “On writing off state budget
debts on VAT reimbursements accumulated since  January ”.
 See the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolution dated  September  “On putting in order VAT
reimbursements and budget settlements”.
to adjust interest incomes on deposits
to inflation. In the same manner, taxing
immovable property proceeds should
also be adjusted to inflation levels.
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write'offs and barriers to budget liquidi'
ty;
 In January , the government aboli'
shed the right of joint enterprises, as well
as enterprises to which all tax refunds
have been paid, to use tax bills in order
to increase budget revenues. Such a de'
cision does not expand the tax base, and
it raises additional barriers for certain
import enterprises.
Meanwhile, important legislative decisions
that would have allowed the prevention of
rent'seeking and expanded the tax base
have not been adopted. This draft law com'
prises the following decisions, which would
allow to prevent rent'seeking and enlarge
the list of taxable operations, in particular:
 Canceling subsidies to agricultural pro'
ducers and to enterprises of the meat'
and milk'processing sector. Reforming
the benefit tax regime in agriculture
would mean that big enterprises (those
which are legislatively required to regis'
ter as taxpayers) pay tax on general terms.
Small'sized enterprises in this sector
would be entitled to accrue, deduct, and
leave at their disposal VAT sums at %
for forestry and fishery and % for other
types of agricultural activity. We see this
measure as being positive, since it would
restore equal market conditions and fos'
ter competition thereby reducing possi'
bilities for tax evasion. Of course, the
price of abolished subsidies would lower
profits of agricultural enterprises.
 Reforming the special economic zones.
In our opinion, it is advisable to reduce
the number of SEZ and PDT, and then
divide them into narrowly specialised
ones. In the process of SEZ liquidation it
would be prohibited to approve new in'
vestment projects; meanwhile, projects
that had already been initiated would be
concluded in order to maintain confi'
dence in the government;
 Implementation of a separate tax regime
for newly created enterprises, where
they would be temporarily registered as
taxpayers and entitled to tax credits only
when their tax obligations arise and solely
within their scope. The decision to limit
refunds for newly created enterprises is
fully justified, since most frequently eva'
sion from proper VAT payments is done
through creating fake firms. Concurrent'
ly, such regulation will raise more barri'
ers to market entry and will cause a high'
er inflow of applications for the creation
of new enterprises in free economic
zones.
Other changes: equality of taxpayers
This year, the Verkhovna Rada abolished
excise benefits for ethanol and wine pro'
duced by domestic enterprises, which will
ensure equal conditions in the market.
At the same time, the following legislative
decisions are expected to exacerbate the
inequality of tax burden distribution:
 Granting benefits in the taxation of pro'
ceeds from equipment sales for export.
Apart from creating unequal conditions
in the machine'building sector, such
benefits (which are actually export sub'
sidies) contradict WTO rules, and
 See the draft Law of Ukraine dated  June  “On amending the Law of Ukraine ‘On the value'
added tax’”.
 See QUARTERLY PREDICTIONS, No.  (July ), p. –.
 See the Law of Ukraine dated  October  “On amending certain laws of Ukraine pertaining to
taxation, production, and turnover of excisable goods”.
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hence can prompt countermeasures by
Ukraine’s trading partners;
  Granting tax benefits to enterprises
generating more than % of their pro'
ceeds from the sale of innovative pro'
ducts received over the accounting peri'
od;
 Tax benefits extended to enterprises
manufacturing trucks and autobuses
(see OPEN ECONOMY).
 See the Law of Ukraine dated  February  “On stimulating domestic machine building for the agri'
industrial complex”.
 See the Law of Ukraine dated  July  “On investment activity”.
 Products are seen as innovative if they fall under the following requirements: () produced by a
registered innovative project on the territory of Ukraine; () produced on the territory of Ukraine;
() were produced for the first time in Ukraine, or if not for the first time, then compared with other
analogous products displayed in the market, such products must be more competitive and have a
substantially higher technical and economic indicators; and () its products were recognised as innovative
by the state agency for innovative activity.
 See the Law of Ukraine dated  November  “On amending certain legislative acts of Ukraine on
the state support for the car'manufacturing industry”.
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Regulation of economic activity
Over October –November , no notable changes occurred in government
policy regulating economic activity, with support for small business remaining only
declarative. Moreover, there was a movement away from the single licensing
procedure during this period, which pushed up enterprises’ administrative
expenditures. As to positive changes in the legislation regulating business activity,
among the key ones were the demonopolisation of the market providing confirmation
of compliance services, and the adjustment of the Law of Ukraine “On the quality
and safety of foodstuffs and food raw materials” to the norms of the World Trade
Organisation
Small business policy
Licensing of business activity
In order to enforce the Law of Ukraine
dated  December  “On the national
program to promote small business develop'
ment in Ukraine”, on  November  the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine issued the
Directive “On measures to enforce the Na'
tional Program to Promote Small Business
Development in ”.  The list of program
tasks includes the following: () develop
legislative acts aimed at simplifying condi'
tions for the activities of small enterprises,
and () determine undertakings which will
require targeted financing, including the
creation of new databases, implementation
of educational programs, and scientific re'
search works on regulatory policy. However,
this document fails to specify sources of fi'
nancing, stating only that it should be in'
cluded in the State Budget for . Fur'
thermore, no mechanism is created for allo'
cating funds for the different measures; in
our opinion, under such conditions it is
most unlikely that they will be implemen'
ted.
Over October –November , there
was movement away from the single proce'
dure for licensing business activity, and the
number of licensable types of activity in'
creased. We believe that the failure to en'
force the transparent single procedure will
lead to increased administrative expendi'
tures of enterprises, and corruption in cor'
responding government bodies. In particu'
lar, the procedure was violated with regard
to the following types of activity:
 HIGHER EDUCATION. The Law of Ukraine
dated  January  “On higher edu'
cation” establishes a special procedure for
licensing in the sphere of education, with
the term “licensing” in this law differing
substantially from the formulation used
in the Law of Ukraine “On licensing cer'
tain types of economic activity”. The re'
quirement of conducting preliminary li'
censing expertises is none other than a
rejection of the application principle;
 PERFUMERY AND COSMETICS PRODUCTION.
The Law of Ukraine dated  March 
“On amending Article  of the Law of
Ukraine ‘On licensing certain types of
economic activity’” instituted the licens'
ing of perfumery and cosmetics produc'
tion utilising ethanol. In our opinion,
such production is not hazardous to hu'
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man life or health, to the environment,
or to state security, therefore there is no
need for any special permission. We be'
lieve that the state ushered in licensing
for this type of activity solely to tackle
the problem of tax evasion. However,
this is improper, since it heaps unjusti'
fied expenses upon law'abiding enter'
prises.
Compact discs (CDs)
The need to enhance the protection of in'
tellectual property rights (IPR) prompted
the introduction of licensing for compact
discs (see OPEN ECONOMY). Our assessment
of this fact is positive, all the more so that
the licensing procedure for the two types of
activity (the production of compact discs and
the export/import of equipment/CDs) fol'
lows the single procedure for licensing busi'
ness activity.
Nonetheless, we believe that the law has
drawbacks, due to the fact that the amend'
ments entered into the Law of Ukraine “On
licensing certain types of economic activity”
apply to all types of activity in Ukraine neces'
sitating licenses. Firstly, the data listed in li'
censes was additionally extended with the
item “Appendix (indicate number of pages)”.
The Law of Ukraine “On the particularities
of state regulation of the activities of econom'
ic entities related to the production, export,
and import of compact discs” reveals the con'
tent of this document (data on production
equipment and storage facilities), but this re'
quirement now applies to other types of ac'
tivity. This will create opportunities for cor'
ruption, since licensing agencies may require
all kinds of appendices. Secondly, the notion
of “monitoring the existence of licenses” is
introduced, which will imply corresponding
on'site checks at enterprises.
 See the Law of Ukraine dated  January  “On the peculiarities of state regulation of activities of
economic entities that are related to the production, export, and import of compact discs”.
Economic competition
Technical regulation
In order to enforce the Law of Ukraine dated
 January  “On the protection of eco'
nomic competition”, during the evaluated
period two normative acts were adopted. First'
ly, a Directive of the Antimonopoly Commit'
tee dated  December  “On the Regu'
lations on the procedure for conducting
checks of compliance with legislation on the
protection of economic competition”. The
document establishes: () clear procedures
for conducting scheduled and unscheduled
checks; () an inclusive list of reasons for con'
ducting unscheduled checks; and () the
main principles used in forming lists of eco'
nomic entities subject to scheduled checks
(in particular, small and medium'sized en'
terprises are not included on the list). We
believe that this directive will improve the
transparency of relations between enterpri'
ses and the Antimonopoly Committee.
Secondly, on  February  the Cabinet
of Ministers of Ukraine issued a Resolution
“On approving the Procedure for issuing the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine permission
to engage in coordinated activities, and the
concentration of economic entities”, which
establishes the procedure to provide it, as
well as the authorities and ways of interac'
tion between the Ministry of Economy and
the Antimonopoly Committee. This gives
grounds to hope that the introduction of the
new procedure will enhance the protection
of competition in Ukraine.
Over the report period, the status of the
authorised body on technical regulation
underwent crucial changes: the State Com'
mittee on Standardisation, Metrology, and
Certification of Ukraine was transformed
into the State Committee of Ukraine on Tech'
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nical Regulation and Consumer Policy—a
central executive government body with
special status. We believe that it will take on
the majority of managerial functions in this
sphere, despite the declared separation of
powers that should delegate them to corre'
sponding sectoral government bodies.
A positive accomplishment in the govern'
ment policy on technical regulation was the
adoption of a Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
resolution dated  March  “On approv'
ing the procedures for certification agencies
to grant authorities for providing services
confirming compliance in legislatively re'
gulated spheres”, which will spur the de'
monopolisation of this sector. The resolu'
tion creates an independent agency for ac'
crediting enterprises that provide services
of confirming compliance. Thus, now even
private enterprises will be able to provide
such services, whereas before, solely enter'
prises of the UkrSEPRO Ukrainian State
Product Certification System were entitled
to confirm compliance.
An essential sequel to the abovementioned
resolution was the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine resolution dated  April  “On
approving the Rules for calculating the cost
of works confirming compliance in legisla'
tively regulated spheres”, which determines
the inclusive list of payable services, as well
as labour content standards for works con'
firming compliance; these rules will allow
the prevention of any unjustified price sur'
ges on such services.
Holographic protection
The mandatory usage of holographic pro'
tective elements for documents and goods
was actually implemented after the adoption
of the Cabinet of Ministers resolution dated
 July  “On approving the lists of docu'
ments and groups of goods subject to pro'
tection with holographic elements”. This list
includes: () personal medical record books
(form No. 'ОМК); () medical certificates
confirming the ability to drive vehicles (form
No. /о); () permits to launch the work
of enterprises, institutions, and organisa'
tions; () excise marks on alcohol products;
() excise marks on tobacco products;
() blank certificates of compliance of the
UkrSEPRO state certification system, along
with appendices and copies; and () blank
certificates of acknowledgement, along with
appendices and copies.
Our arguments against the mandatory usa'
ge of holographic protection are as follows:
 the holographic protective element in
medical books or certificates does not
guarantee the authenticity of the record,
nor of observance of established proce'
dures;
 holographic protection of excise labels,
certificate forms, and certificates of ac'
knowledgement increase the operatio'
nal and administrative costs of business
entities, while the implications of its
usage do not differ from those induced
by the system of “rigid accountability
forms”.
We believe that the only enterprises bene'
fiting from such an innovation would be the
ones producing holographic protective ele'
ments. In our opinion, this procedure
should be voluntary so that non'productive
expenditures can be avoided.
 Pursuant to the Presidential Decree dated  October  “On the State Committee of Ukraine on
Technical Regulation and Consumer Policy”.
Food product quality and safety
On  October , the Verkhovna Rada
adopted the Law of Ukraine “On amending
the Law of Ukraine ‘On the quality and safe'
ty of foodstuffs and food raw materials’”, aim'
ing to enhance consumer safety, adjust the
law in question to WTO norms, and align it
with EU laws. In our opinion, it includes
the following positive features:
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 New necessary terms were introduced
(e.g., “forged products”, “poor'quality
products”, “unsafe products”) and those
already existing were made more precise
(e.g., “biologically active food supple'
ments”);
 Certification was taken out of the pur'
view of the law, since it is regulated by
the Law of Ukraine dated  May 
“On confirming compliance”;
 The concept of “public catering service”
was abolished (instead, only the con'
cept of “food products” is used), which
will eliminate the need for double'
checking food quality indicators and
sanitary norms in public catering facili'
ties;
 The State Registry for Special and New
Food Products was introduced, replac'
ing the state registry for all foodstuffs and
raw food materials, which were virtually
impossible to cover;
 New requirements for marking food pro'
ducts were introduced, which must in'
clude information about nutrition and en'
ergy value, date of manufacture or expiry
and “best before” date, existence of ge'
netically modified materials, and con'
sumption warnings for certain groups
of people—as required by the European
Union.
At the same time, the law extends the list of
documents required to confirm compliance.
Now, the list includes a certificate of hygiene;
additionally, depending on the territory
where enterprises aim to sell products of
animal origin, different veterinary docu'
ments will be required.
Our opinion is that although the law will
drive up enterprise expenditures for adjust'
ing to the new rules in the short run, the total
effect from its adoption will be positive, since
it harmonises measures regarding food qual'
ity and safety with EU legislation and enhan'
ces the protection of food consumers.
 Under the Law of Ukraine dated  October  “On amending the Law of Ukraine ‘On the quality
and safety of food products and raw food materials’”, “special food products” include dietetic, health'
promoting, and preventive food products and biologically active food supplements, baby food, and food
for athletes; and “new food products” are either those () produced for the first time in Ukraine;
() using components not used before or genetically modified ones; () imported for the first time to
Ukraine; or () produced based on new technologies which significantly alter their physical and chemical
indicators and/or their nutritional value.
Impact of land legislation on the regulation of
business activity
The Land Code of Ukraine, passed by the
Verkhovna Rada on  October  (see
AGRICULTURE), restrained the rights of per'
petual land usage by private enterprises (this
right was only retained by enterprises which
manage multi'unit housing blocks).
According to the Transitional Provisions of
the Land Code, enterprises that lost their
right of perpetual land usage should re'
register their rights of usage as rights of
ownership or rental by  January .
Whereas it is very costly to buy out land plots,
in our opinion the majority of small and
medium businesses will shift to land rental.
However, this will worsen the business cli'
mate, because land rent fees will be paid in
addition to the single tax—unlike the land
tax established for landowners and users. Be'
sides, there are risks that local government
bodies will seek to conclude short'term land
lease agreements in order to create possibi'
lities for obtaining kickbacks.
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Open economy
Over October –November , the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine did little to adjust legislation to WTO norms. The adoption
of a new Customs Code and a Law of Ukraine “On the particularities of state
regulation of business entities, associated with production, export, import of CDs
for laser data*reading systems” were the only accomplishments in this area.
Moreover, protectionism increased, manifesting in the adoption of laws which
contradict WTO requirements. In our opinion, this situation is due to () the
disinterest of powerful interest groups in acceding to this organisation; and
() the lack of a mechanism for monitoring the compliance of draft laws and
government resolutions with WTO norms. A constructive move fostering market
openness to labour migration became the abolishment of limitations on the
employment term for foreigners and stateless individuals in Ukraine
Trade openness
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) fur'
nishes the institutional framework and co'
ordination for the liberalisation of interna'
tional trade. Accession to this organisation,
for which Ukraine has been preparing for
nine years already, requires the adjustment
of national legislation to WTO norms. The
most important changes to be made by the
Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Minis'
ters in Ukrainian laws and normative acts in
order to bring them into line with WTO
norms are stipulated in a decree of the Pre'
sident of Ukraine as follows:
 to enforce national treatment in the
economy (to date, this has not been
done in the sectors of financial, banking,
telecommunications, transport, medical,
and insurance services, nor in the elec'
tricity or automobile manufacturing sec'
tors);
 to eliminate discriminatory protectio'
nism in agriculture (import and export
quotas and subsidies, which are banned
by the WTO Agriculture Agreement), in
the ferrous metallurgy complex (export
duty on ferrous scrap metal, prohibition
of non'ferrous scrap metal exports), and
automobile manufacturing (conducting
discriminatory special investigation);
 to modify technical regulations (stand'
ardisation, certification, sanitary and
phytosanitary norms) in accordance with
international standards;
 to improve the protection of intellectual
property rights (IPR).
 See the Presidential Decree dated  February  “On the action program for the final stage of
Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organisation”.
 The national treatment is intended to ensure equal footing for national and foreign enterprises,
operating in Ukraine or selling their products here. The national treatment is breached if, for instance,
tax benefits are extended to national enterprises competing with importers of analogous products.
 See QUARTERLY PREDICTIONS, No.  (April ), p. –.
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Unfortunately, over the past twelve months
the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Mini'
sters have hardly done anything in terms of
adjusting Ukrainian legislation to WTO
norms (the only major changes were adopt'
ing a new Customs Code and a law regulat'
ing the production, export, and import of
CDs). Moreover, protectionism increased,
manifested in the adoption of laws contra'
dicting WTO requirements. We believe this
situation is due to () the disinterest of power'
ful interest groups in acceding to this organi'
sation; and () the lack of a mechanism for
monitoring the compliance of draft laws and
government decisions with WTO norms.
Customs Code
The Verkhovna Rada adopted a new Customs
Code after debating it for almost four years.
The new Customs Code was designed in line
with international standards in the domain
of goods classification and coding, customs
procedures (customs control and clearance,
customs value assessment, identification of
country of origin, etc.). The simpler and more
transparent customs procedures stipulated
in the newly adopted Customs Code will al'
low the reduction of transaction expendi'
tures for foreign trade agents.
The key positive changes compared to the
previous code are the following:
 Recognition of the equality of customs pro'
cedures, regardless of country or owner of
goods/vehicles, and establishment of le'
gislative regulation for customs regi'
mes and conditions of their application
to export/import transactions;
 Switch to new methods for assessing the
customs value of goods. Now, the Cus'
toms Code makes an allowance for the
possibility that prices set by different
importers may vary for the same product.
The customs agencies may disregard the
contract cost when setting the import
duty only when the veracity of the de'
clared price is doubted. Even in such
cases, the customs agencies must permit
importers to justify their price, and must
present a written explanation for their
refusal to use the contract cost if the jus'
tification fails to satisfy them;
 Introduction of new rules for identifying
country of origin, based upon WTO prin'
ciples. These rules neither restrict nor
distort external trade, since they do not
require the fulfillment of requirements
irrelevant to production or processing;
 The possibility to apply simpler customs
clearance procedures to foreign trade
agents who over a certain period of time
have not violated cross'border shipment
terms. In addition, it is now possible to
use a simpler declaration form for occa'
sionally imported goods (a periodical
customs declaration).
The final version of the code takes into con'
sideration the remarks of the President ex'
pressed when vetoing the Customs Code
adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
on  December : () the parts pertain'
 The Verkhovna Rada adopted a new Customs Code on  July , which will come in effect on
 January .
 According to the results of the enterprise survey held by the International Finance Corporation in
, % of respondents consider customs procedures to be a grave obstacle to the development of
their enterprises. Specifically, respondents believe that customs procedures are overly expensive, time'
consuming, and cumbersome.
 The customs regime is a set of legal provisions, established by the customs legislation, which set the
border'crossing order in Ukraine for vehicles and goods and the application of customs procedures to
them depending on border'crossing purpose. All in all, there are  customs regimes established,
specifically, import, re'import, export, re'export, goods transit, temporary goods import (export), cus'
toms licensed warehouses, processing on the territory of Ukraine. The extant Customs Code is lacking
the notion of the customs regime.
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ing to tax and levy collection, as well as to
the functioning of special economic zones,
were deleted, since they are regulated by
other laws; and () the State Customs Ser'
vice (SCS) was deprived of the right to en'
gage in operative and investigative activity
(the previous version of the code had
equaled the SCS to law'enforcement agen'
cies in status).
In order to efficiently implement the new
Customs Code, it is essential to coordinate
all relevant by'laws with it, specifically, with
the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution dated
 October  “On approval of the Proce'
dure for Assessing the Customs Value of
Goods and Other Items When they Cross
the Customs Border of Ukraine”.
Intellectual property rights
protection
The adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On
particularities of state regulation of business
entities, associated with production, export,
import of CDs for laser data'reading systems”
can significantly enhance the protection of
intellectual property rights (IPR) in
Ukraine, without overly hampering manu'
facturers’ activity, since:
 The law only applies to recorded audio
and video discs (the previous draft law,
which had been adopted in first read'
ing, introduced obligatory licensing and
tight control over all CD production);
 Pursuant to this law, responsibility for vi'
olating IPR will be laid on customers,
with fines in the amount of % of the
cost of the goods, but no less than ,–
, non'taxable minimum amounts; if
the offense is committed in “large
amounts”, the law envisages detainment
for up to five years. We believe that this
punishment is severe enough to signifi'
cantly outweigh the expected gain from
pirate activity;
 The law will limit the possibilities for ex'
cessive inspections.
However, in the past twelve months the Civ'
il Code, which should provide for frame'
work regulation of intellectual property
rights has not been approved (see PROPER*
TY RELATIONS). Moreover, despite the dramat'
ic improvement of legislative regulation of
IPR, the volume of infringed rights has hard'
ly diminished, and unlicensed audio and
video discs are sold with virtually no limita'
tions. In our opinion, the reasons behind
this situation remain: () the disinterest of
most of society in IPR protection; and
() the absence of effective mechanisms for
enforcing corresponding legislative acts.
Protectionism
AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURING
Over the past year, measures were under'
taken to protect the national automobile in'
dustry. Firstly, the Verkhovna Rada adopted
a law which () extends tax benefits (ex'
emption from VAT and import duty, bene'
fits on the corporate profit tax, the tax on
dividends, and the land tax) to manufactu'
rers of autobuses and trucks, as well as manu'
facturers of spare parts for them (as long as
investments in the share capital of these
 Evaluation of the draft law, which has not been adopted in second reading due to blatant flaws, see
QUARTERLY PREDICTIONS, No.  (October ), p. .
 When conducting a regular check of observance of license terms and conditions, state controlling
agencies should notify a manufacturer ten days in advance. In addition, controlling agencies have the
right to spot'check upon written inquiry/statement, although a person demanding this spot'check will be
liable if the facts supplied by him/her will not be confirmed.
 For more details, please see POLICY STUDIES, No.  (October ), p. .
 See the Law of Ukraine dated  November  “On amending certain legislative acts of Ukraine on
state support for Ukraine’s car'manufacturing industry.”
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 Pursuant to this law, before only those car'manufacturing enterprises had been granted benefits, the
sum of investment in which totaled not less than  million USD. In fact, benefits reached only one
enterprise—AvtoZAZ'Daewoo.
 On  December  the Inter'Departmental Commission on International Trade adopted a decision
to impose quotas for Russian car imports.
 See the Law of Ukraine dated  October  “On exit (export) duty on waste ferroproducts and
ferrous scrap metal”.
 In , Russia resorted to anti'dumping measures with regard to imports of Ukrainian pipes, caramel,
steel rods, and flat'rolled metal and conducted special probes into imports of Ukrainian tyres and crystal
silicon.
enterprises amounts to not less than  mil'
lion and  million USD, respectively); and
() drives up import duty rates for spare parts
of automobiles up from two' to ten'fold for
enterprises not enjoying these tax benefits.
In our opinion, increasing tax benefits
strengthens the discriminatory protection of
certain enterprises in this sector. The higher
import duty on spare parts will bring net loss'
es for the manufacturing industry, with both
assembly plants and consumers suffering
from significantly higher repair costs; in the
meantime, the government increased its sup'
port to inefficient production—primarily of
the AvtoZAZ'Daewoo Company, which crip'
pled by competition from other auto manu'
facturers.
Secondly, a special % import duty was
imposed upon Russian cars, in force till
 December . The basis for introdu'
cing the special import duty on Russian cars
was the result of a special probe into the da'
mages incurred by AvtoZAZ'Daewoo and the
Lutsk Automobile Plant from the imports of
Russian cars. We consider this conclusion to
be doubtful, given the large number of be'
nefits received by these enterprises (espe'
cially AvtoZAZ'Daewoo). It is rather proof of
the uncompetitiveness of these Ukrainian
products. Furthermore, we believe that the
% import duty on Russian automobiles
will lead to net losses for Ukraine’s econo'
my, due to the following reasons:
 support being extended in Ukraine for
the inefficient production of automo'
biles that are of lower quality and have a
higher price than they would under com'
petitive conditions, and thus they are un'
competitive in the global market;
 consumers suffer because they cannot
afford to purchase the items they want—
to illustrate, following the introduction
of the import duty, the price of AvtoVAZ
cars grew by –, USD, which is
critical for cars of this category.
FERROUS METALLURGY
Here, protectionism manifested itself in the
introduction of a  euro per ton export duty
on waste ferroproducts and ferrous scrap
metal. In our opinion, this move will cause
the following adverse repercussions: () the
introduction of an export duty is, in other
words, a subsidy for metallurgic enterprises,
which will permit Ukraine’s trading partners
to resort to countervailing measures; and
() such practice is a breach of WTO norms
and will be one more hurdle in Ukraine’s
accession to this organisation.
ANTI*DUMPING PROBES
INTO RUSSIAN GOODS IMPORTS
Over the past twelve months, Ukraine con'
ducted anti'dumping measures against elec'
tric lamps, artificial fur, and iron ore import'
ed from Russia, and held special probes into
the import of Russian soda, cement, and
passenger automobiles. In our opinion,
Ukraine and Russia restrict their mutual
trade due to pressure from certain national
producers which lobby for protectionism.
Restrictions on imports will lead to in'
creased production of less competitive na'
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Openness to labour migration
The lifting of restrictions on employment
terms for foreigners and stateless individu'
als in Ukraine (until now, the maximum
employment term was four years) was a move
forward in bringing down the barriers to la'
bour migration. Employment permits will be
issued for one year, with the possibility of
extending them.
Nevertheless, we believe that excessive bar'
riers to labour migration still persist in
Ukraine. For instance, pursuant to the Cabi'
net of Ministers Resolution dated  Novem'
ber  “On approving the Procedure
for Issuing Employment Permits to Foreign'
ers and Stateless Individuals in Ukraine”
foreigners can obtain employment permits
only if there are no workers in the country
capable of performing the given type of
work, or if there are sufficiently justified
reasons for employing foreign experts.
In general, ten different documents must
be submitted to obtain this permit, and
the whole procedure takes a month on ave'
rage.
 See the Cabinet of Ministers Resolution dated  May  “On modifying the procedures for issuing
employment permits in Ukraine for foreigners and stateless individuals”.
tional products, and inflate their price. Con'
sequently, the economies of both countries
sustain net losses, for their resources are in'
efficiently employed while consumers suf'
fer as they are forced to buy lower'quality
and higher'priced products.
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Financial sector
During October –November , key legislative changes in the financial
sector aimed at regulating the activity of non*banking institutions and counteracting
money laundering were introduced. Over this period, the Verkhovna Rada adopted
the following key pieces of legislation: “On the prevention and counteraction of
legalisation (laundering) of incomes acquired by criminal means”, “On credit
unions”, and “On amending the Law of Ukraine “On insurance”. However, during
this time the government did not manage to devise a long*term development strategy
for the Ukrainian financial sector
We believe that the following trends in
Ukraine’s financial sector have been persist'
ing: () a relatively low level of financial me'
diation; and () an asymmetric development
of the banking and non'banking sectors.
We see the following overriding problems
which stifle the development of the Ukraini'
an financial system most of all as:
 the lack of a long'term development
strategy for the sector;
 delays in creating a supervisory agency
over non'banking financial institutions,
and an insufficient number of normative
acts regulating their activity;
 inconsistent protection of banks deposi'
tors;
 a lack of legislatively approved rules for
electronic signatures;
 insufficiently active fight against money
laundering.
The government’s policy in Ukraine’s fi'
nancial sector over October –Novem'
ber  sought to regulate the activity of
non'banking institutions and fight against
money laundering. During this period, the
Verkhovna Rada undertook certain moves
in resolving the above problems, particular'
ly in the adoption of a new version of the
Law of Ukraine “On insurance”, as well as
laws “On credit unions” and “On the pre'
vention and counteraction of legalisation
(laundering) of incomes acquired by crimi'
nal means”. However, during this time the
government did not manage to design a long'
term development strategy for the financial
sector.
Regulation of non'banking financial institutions
As we had predicted earlier, the vagueness
in the Law of Ukraine dated  July  “On
financial services and state regulation of fi'
nancial services markets” regarding the es'
tablishment terms for the State Commission
on Financial Services Market Regulation (the
authorised executive government body reg'
ulating financial services markets) delayed
the process of its formation. This situation,
 See POLICY STUDIES, No.  (October ), p. .
 See POLICY STUDIES, No.  (October ), p. .
 The State Commission on Financial Services Market Regulation was formed only on  December .
Practice has shown that the establishment and formation of a new executive authority in Ukraine lasts
– months.
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in turn, led to the following negative conse'
quences:
 The activities of non'banking financial
institutions in the banking transactions
market were blocked, since according to
the NBU’s Regulations on the proce'
dure for issuing licenses to engage in
certain banking operations by non'bank'
ing institutions, in order to provide fi'
nancial services they have to obtain such
a document from the authorised execu'
tive body in this sphere;
 The development of credit unions
slowed; pursuant to the Law of Ukraine
dated  December  “On credit
unions”, they are to be registered by the
State Commission on Financial Services
Market Regulation. Furthermore, the
activities of credit unions will be ham'
pered by double reporting, since they
have to agree their charters and finan'
cial issues with the National Bank of
Ukraine. We believe that in order to cur'
tail state regulation expenditures and
credit unions’ cost of business, control
should be exercised by a single body.
Over the research period, only the activi'
ties of credit unions were regulated by law,
in contrast to those of pawnbrokers and non'
state pension funds.
Credit unions
We believe that the Law of Ukraine “On cre'
dit unions” contains the following positive
features:
 The law makes it impossible to create
“pocket” credit unions by stipulating that
() the number of founders should be not
less than  individuals; () credit union
obligations towards any single member
(specifically, liabilitity on deposits) can'
not exceed % of the total obligations;
and () the size of a loan granted to a sin'
gle member cannot exceed % of the
capital;
 Credit unions are allowed to create local
cooperative banks, which are still non'
existent in Ukraine. This will spur their
development and will allow the use of a
wide variety of financial tools;
 In order to mitigate bankruptcy risks for
credit unions, the law sets clear require'
ments as to their capital, which cannot
be less than % of total obligations. Thus,
the overly active involvement of money is
obstructed; in particular, the total amount
of borrowing should not exceed % of
total obligations, or of the credit union’s
capital on the day of borrowing.
However, in order to effectively enforce the
Law of Ukraine “On credit unions”, nume'
rous by'laws should be adopted.
Capitalisation requirements
to financial institutions
Over the research period, capitalisation re'
quirements to financial institutions were
tightened:
 On  October , the Verkhovna Rada
adopted the Law of Ukraine “On amend'
ing the Law of Ukraine ‘On insurance’”,
imposing tighter requirements for the
size of the share capital of insurance com'
panies. Within two years of the adoption
of the law, it should be enlarged from
, to , euro, and to  million
euro within the third year; moreover, for
life insurance companies the amounts are
from , to , euro and to
. million euro, respectively;
 The National Bank of Ukraine issued
Regulations on the procedure for grant'
ing general licenses to non'banking fi'
nancial institutions for engaging in hard
currency transactions, which require
 The NBU adopted these Regulations on  August , and they came into effect on  January .
 Credit union capital consists of share, reserve, and additional capitals, as well as the remainder of its
undivided revenues.
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having share capital equivalent to not
less than . million euro as a condition
for granting this license.
We believe that trends in the insurance servi'
ces market will be similar to those in the bank'
ing sector over –: () merging and
buyouts of small companies; and () the sec'
tor will attract foreign capital. The inflows of
foreign capital will be stimulated by the fol'
lowing  provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On
insurance”: () eliminated restrictions as to
the share of foreign participants in the share
capital of insurance companies; and () re'
laxed requirements as to the forming by in'
surance companies of charter funds of other
insurance companies of Ukraine. Concur'
rently, the norm stating that only residents
can act as insurance companies in Ukraine
will have an adverse effect; this increases fo'
reign companies’ expenditures on launch'
ing business in Ukraine.
Compensation of losses
from bankruptcy incurred
by financial institutions
During this research period, the Verkhov'
na Rada undertook the following measures,
promoting the boost of public confidence
in the banking system:
 Adopted the Law of Ukraine dated
 March  “On putting in order the
debts owing on the individual deposits
of depositors and other creditors of the
Ukraina Joint'Stock Commercial Agro'In'
dustrial Bank”, altering the order of
claims satisfaction. The law recognises
first'priority creditors to be individuals
whose bank contributions did not exceed
, UAH, while second priority was
given to persons whose requirements
were secured by pledge (which traditio'
nally has priority), and the National Bank
of Ukraine and State Tax Administration
were placed among the creditors of the
third line;
 Approved the Law of Ukraine dated
 September  “On the Fund for
Guaranteeing Individual Deposits”,
which raised the secured maximum
of reimbursements to depositors from
 UAH to , UAH.
Furthermore, the absence of new bankrupt'
cies among Ukrainian banks over , and
a gradual rise in the number of members of
the Fund for Guaranteeing Individual De'
posits (FGID), allowed the latter by YE’
to increase the size of secured reimburse'
ments to , UAH. We believe that this
change resolved the problem of insuring the
deposits of a large portion of society, given
that at YE’ deposits of up to , UAH at
commercial banks accounted for more than
% of the total.
We believe that the precedent of adopting a
separate law on the bankruptcy of a specific
company can become a misguided practice
of unfair distribution of liquidation assets.
 The Law of Ukraine dated  December  “On banks and banking activity” imposed more rigid
requirements as to the minimal amount of the banks’ share capital:  million euro for local cooperative
banks;  million euro for commercial banks operating on the territory of a single oblast; and  million euro
for banks operating on the whole territory of Ukraine. These requirements will come into effect on
 January .
 In the previous redaction of the law, the total share of foreign legal entities and foreign citizens in the
shareholder capital of insurance companies could not exceed %.
 The maximum allowable total amount of contributions made by an insurance company to the share
capital of other insurance companies in Ukraine picked up from  to %; in particular, the size of
contributions to the share capital of an individual insurance company was raised from  to %.
 The fund numbers  member banks (out of  having an NBU license for banking operations). The
Oschadbank Savings Bank is not a FGID member; individual deposits in this bank are guaranteed in full
by the state.
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Legalisation of electronic signatures
On  September , the Verkhovna Rada
adopted the first reading of the Law of
Ukraine “On electronic digital signatures”,
which equals them in legal validity to hand'
written signatures. We regard it as expedi'
ent to adopt this law as soon as possible, since
it will allow to: () cut the costs of financial
transactions; () speed up settlements; and
() create the legal framework for electro'
nic document circulation.
In addition, the bankruptcy of the Slovian'
sky and Ukraina banks revealed that nowa'
days the following problems related to the
protection of depositors’ rights are foremost:
() long waiting period for compensation of
business losses; and () the high risk of non'
reimbursements to creditors of second or
lower priority. We believe that given a defi'
cit in liquidation assets, compensation to
depositors and investors should be propor'
tionate to the size of their contributions,
except for the founders and the regulatory
agency, which should be the last to be reim'
bursed.
Regulation of the stock market
No notable changes in the legislation regu'
lating stock market activity occurred in Oc'
tober –November . The outdated
framework Law of Ukraine “On securities
and the stock exchange”, adopted in ,
is still in effect, while the draft law “On se'
curities and the stock market”, which is to
supersede it, has been fruitlessly debated
by the Verkhovna Rada for three years al'
ready.
Additionally, over the research period the
Verkhovna Rada entered no amendments
to the Law of Ukraine dated  October 
“On the National Depository System and
particulars regarding the electronic circula'
tion of securities in Ukraine” that would
improve the system of ownership rights ac'
counting in Ukraine. In our opinion, this
law needs to undergo the following modifi'
cations: () creation of a single Central De'
pository, which will eliminate the conflict
between the state National Depository of
Ukraine, and non'state Interregional Stock
Union depository; and () strengthening the
protection of registrars’ and keepers’ rights,
which would allow decreasing the risks of
their activity and reducing the costs of their
services.
Progress was achieved only in regulating the
activities of joint investment institutions,
which given the immature stock market in
Ukraine are the most suitable venture funds.
Adoption of essential by'laws permitted the
granting of the first licenses to asset mana'
gement companies at YE’. We expect that
already in  there will emerge new joint
investment institutions in Ukraine, which
will work with the funds of legal entities.
We are of the opinion that the decision of the
State Property Fund of Ukraine, the State
Committee on Securities and the Stock Mar'
ket (SCSSM), and the Antimonopoly Com'
mittee dated  January  regarding re'
strictions on and gradual reduction of tariffs
for the services of registrars (who are mono'
polists) to an economically justified level will
not resolve the problem of “pocket” registrars.
In fact, this decision would result in a re'
duced number of independent registrars, for
whom keeping registries is their only activi'
ty, while enlarging the share of bank regis'
trars, which can cross'subsidise these servi'
ces. Instead, it would be expedient to boost
the requirements of registrars’ capital and
limit the number of self'regulated organisa'
tions—one for each type of activity.
 The framework Law of Ukraine “On joint investment institutions (share and corporate investment
funds)” was passed on  March . For more details on this law, see POLICY STUDIES, No.  (October
), p. –.
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Combating money laundering
The fact that Ukraine was added to the FATF
blacklist in autumn , along with the
greater threat of sanctions being imposed by
this international organisation, hit the coun'
try’s financial sector most heavily; its agents
began receiving additional inquiries from
their overseas partners, who demand higher
prices for their services. The FATF has insis'
ted that Ukraine ratify a law on illegal money
laundering and regulate the activities of its
authorised financial monitoring agency.
On  November , the Verkhovna Rada
adopted the Law of Ukraine “On the pre'
vention and counteraction of legalisation
(laundering) of incomes acquired by crimi'
nal means”, tightening control over finan'
cial transactions with the following measures:
 Legally approving the creation of a State
Department for Financial Monitoring as
the official government financial moni'
toring agency;
 Two levels of financial monitoring were
established—primary (banks, financial in'
stitutions, and other legal entities engag'
ing in financial transactions) and state
(NBU, the State Committee on Securi'
ties and the Stock Market (SCSSM), as
well as the specially authorised financial
monitoring body);
 It is permitted to consider any transac'
tion which seems dubious to a primary
monitoring agency to be a money laun'
dering one;
 The Code of Ukraine on Administrative
Offences was amended, namely: a penal'
ty was introduced for disclosing informa'
tion pertaining to financial transactions
subject to monitoring. It amounts to –
 non'taxable minimum monthly in'
dividual incomes (,–, UAH).
We believe that this move will not make
monitoring bodies more responsible,
because the penalty is too small com'
pared to the value of trade secrets.
Additionally, the National Bank of Ukraine
tightened its grip over foreign branches of
Ukrainian banks. Firstly, the NBU regulated
the procedures for granting permission to
make overseas investments in creating sub'
sidiary banks, affiliates, and bank represent'
ative offices on the territory of other states;
only banks with share capital of at least 
million euro can create subsidiary banks or
affiliates, and in order to open a representa'
tive office, a bank’s share capital must be no
less than  million euro. In our opinion,
strict regulation of the opening of overseas
bank branches will help the NBU to control
them better.
Secondly, the NBU introduced a mandatory
review of banks’ foreign branches when their
head offices undergo a comprehensive re'
view. However, there are to be no reviews if
 FATF (Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering) is an inter'governmental body which devised
the “Forty Recommendations on Measures to Combat Money Laundering” and “Special Recommenda'
tions on Terrorist Financing”. FATF members include  countries and two international organisations.
 The State Department for Financial Monitoring was created in January  pursuant to a Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine resolution.
 See the resolution of the NBU Board dated  January  “On the approval of the Regulations on the
procedures for opening subsidiary banks, affiliates, or representative offices of Ukrainian banks on the
territory of other states, and particulars concerning their closing and supervision thereof”.
 See the resolution of the NBU Board dated  May  “On amending certain legal acts of the
National Bank of Ukraine”.
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this is stipulated by “bilateral agreements
between central banks or corresponding bank'
ing supervision agencies” of Ukraine and the
country where the subsidiary is located.
Concurrently, under the pretext of the need
to abide by FATF requirements, over H’
the government adopted a number of deci'
sions aimed at strengthening control over fi'
nancial transactions which cannot actually be
used for money laundering (in particular,
tax payment). Therefore, based on the crite'
ria for classifying financial transactions as sus'
picious and uncommon that were specified
by the Cabinet of Ministers in May , trans'
actions not related to money laundering can
indeed fall under this category. These would
include, for instance, transactions violating
legislatively stipulated terms for settlements
on export/import operations or contractual
transactions that raise doubts as to their law'
fulness. Nonetheless, a Decision of the Pe'
chersk District Court of the City of Kyiv dated
 September  ordered the Cabinet of
Ministers to revoke its resolution No.  “On
setting criteria for classifying financial trans'
actions as dubious and uncommon”; this,
however, has not been done yet.
Despite these measures undertaken, the
FATF recognised Ukraine as a country not
cooperating in the sphere of money laun'
dering. We believe that this was due to:
() the sluggish reaction of the government
and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to FATF
requirements; and () the negative image
of Ukraine in the world. The FATF sugges'
ted that member countries take the follow'
ing measures when working with Ukrainian
companies and individuals:
 carry out a mandatory identity check on
clients before establishing business rela'
tions;
 increase control over reporting on trans'
actions with said persons;
 submit detailed inquiries about the ac'
tivity of Ukrainian banks if they open sub'
sidiaries, affiliates, or representative of'
fices abroad;
 warn all partners, particularly in non'fi'
nancial sectors, about the high risk of
money laundering by clients from
Ukraine.
In our opinion, these measures will not sig'
nificantly worsen conditions for conducting
business, given the willingness of the bank'
ing system to take the additional costs upon
itself of servicing financial flows.
 According to universal practice, unpaid taxes are not considered dirty money, while proceeds from
trafficking drugs, arms, and people do fall under this category. The extant Ukrainian legislation is also
guided by this interpretation. However, the Cabinet of Ministers, when submitting the draft Law of
Ukraine “On the prevention and counteraction of legalisation (laundering) of incomes acquired by
criminal means” for first reading to the Verkhovna Rada, suggested that money obtained as a result of
“committing a crime or actions aimed at concealing sources of such money’s origin”—in particular, unpaid
taxes—be considered dirty. During the debate of the draft law in the parliament, this statement was
deleted.
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Agriculture
The agricultural policy pursued by Ukraine’s government has two aims:
() transforming land into an effective market tool; and () stimulating
agricultural production. The Land Code was the most important legislative act
adopted in agriculture over the past four quarters; however, the promulgation of
numerous by*laws required by the code is overdue. Key drawbacks of new legal
acts aimed at stimulating agriculture are their declarative nature and anti*market
orientation
Exercising land ownership rights
Stimulation of agricultural development
The Land Code was the most important agri'
cultural legislative act passed by the Verkhov'
na Rada over the research period. The ob'
jective of the Land Code and related land legi'
slation is to regulate land relations in order to
secure the land ownership rights of individu'
als, legal entities, territorial communities, and
the government, as well as rational land usage
and protection. Its adoption lays the founda'
tion for creating a free land market, which will
in turn facilitate the gradual transition of land
plots to effective owners. Legislative affirma'
tion of the right to private land ownership is
expected to minimise the likelihood of rever'
sal of reforms in agriculture.
The concluding provisions of the code in'
clude a list of legal acts which were to be
devised by the Cabinet of Ministers within
six months after the publication of the code.
The list of these documents, their role in
the resolution of agricultural problems, im'
plementation mechanisms, and comments
on them, are given in Table .
As of  November , the Cabinet of
Ministers failed to produce a significant
part of the normative'legal acts envisaged
by the Land Code. This delay may lead to
the fact that by  (when the moratori'
um on agricultural land sales is due to ex'
pire) appropriate conditions for free land
sales in Ukraine will not have been crea'
ted.
Unlike other types of economic activity, ag'
ricultural production is very dependent on
weather conditions and natural disasters,
which are difficult to predict and control.
The government creates mechanisms to pre'
vent drastic fluctuations in farm incomes,
since such fluctuations can ruin a large
number of enterprises at once. However, ex'
cessive government interference in the regu'
lation of agricultural production saps its ef'
ficiency, tampers with market mechanisms,
and distorts prices. Therefore, we believe
that the government’s key task is to create
an adequate safety net  that would not foster
excessive dependence on government sup'
port.
Over the research period, several normative
documents were adopted that set forth im'
plementation mechanisms for measures
 The Land Code was approved on  October .
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 No modifications to this draft law were made over the past three years.
 Agricultural landowners received the majority of currently existing land titles during , when the
share of rural residents that exchanged their [land share] certificates for the titles increased from .%
to .%. After the establishment of a unified format for these acts, the share of the rural population
obtaining acts grew only slightly—from % (April ) to .% (December ).
Table . Measures envisaged in the Land Code that facilitate land
reforms in Ukraine
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envisaged in the Law of Ukraine “On pro'
moting the development of agriculture in
–”.
Mandatory crop insurance
On  July , the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine issued a resolution introducing
mandatory crop insurance; this document
became a by'law to the Law of Ukraine “On
insurance” dated  October , and stip'
ulates that the government must pay not less
than % of insurance payments.
Insurance of crops is a universal practice,
which helps farmers to manage their risks
and reduces the probability of devastating
impact of unfavourable weather conditions,
natural disasters, etc. However, in most coun'
tries crop insurance is voluntary. In our
opinion, mandatory insurance in agriculture
has the following drawbacks:
 enterprises have less incentive to inde'
pendently diversify their risks and invest
in agri'technologies, which could help
 For more details on this law, see POLICY STUDIES, No.  (October ), pp. –.
 See the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolution dated  July  “On approval of the Procedure
and rules for effecting mandatory insurance of the agricultural harvest and perennial plantings by state
agricultural enterprises, and of grain crop and sugar beet harvests by agricultural enterprises of all forms
of ownership”.
 See QUARTERLY PREDICTIONS, No.  (July ), pp. –.
Source: International Centre for Policy Studies.
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reduce the dependency of crops on
weather conditions;
 agricultural enterprises can interpret
mandatory insurance as an additional tax
depleting operating funds;
 enterprises which are vertically integra'
ted, and thus are able to independently
diversify their risks, will incur additional
expenditures on mandatory insurance.
Moreover, the breakdown of maximum rates
for insurance tariffs under the mandatory
crop insurance agreements proposed in the
resolution is poorly diversified; hence, it dis'
regards certain differences inherent in the
risks.
Concurrently, we believe that the measures
envisaged in the resolution will not have any
dramatic impact upon Ukrainian agriculture
in the next few years, due to the following
circumstances:
 the number of enterprises insuring their
crops in upcoming years is unlikely to
change compared to previous years,
since the resolution envisages no con'
trol mechanisms over this process;
 insurance companies will not offer crop
insurance services, due to the high risk
of not receiving compensation from the
budget.
We believe that in order to galvanise agri'
culture, the government should stimulate
the use of instruments which do not re'
quire any or require insignificant budget
assignations, and do not tamper with mar'
ket mechanisms such as voluntary insu'
rance, production diversification, vertical
integration, creation of mutual insurance
funds, hedging with futures, and options
against risks.
Grain market
The Law of Ukraine “On grain and the grain
market in Ukraine”, adopted by the Verkhov'
na Rada on  July , targets to resolve
the problem of the sharp fall in prices trig'
gered by the simultaneous supply of huge
grain parties to the market. In order to main'
tain stable grain prices, the law proposes
implementing mechanisms of pledge and
intervention purchases. Nevertheless, in our
opinion the new law has the following flaws:
 leaves open the issue of what to do with
the unredeemed pledged grain;
 does not set forth any procedures for se'
lecting the banks which would grant
loans under the pledged procure'
ments, which is conducive to corrup'
tion;
 the appointment of state agents to con'
duct intervention purchases and facili'
tate pledged grain purchases and the ex'
port/import of grain and grain products
envisages that only state enterprises or
economic entities with a state share of
no less than % in its share capital can
act as agents, which will significantly li'
mit the choice of agents.
We believe that the new law will not have an
immediate dramatic effect upon the grain
market. The number of farmers who will
decide to pledge their grain or sell it to in'
tervention purchase agents will be trifling,
due to the following factors:
 the draft  budget has no line items
for financing pledged and intervention
grain purchases;
 even if the government finances the
pledged purchases, narrowly specialised
 In , the USDA’s Risk Management Agency offered farmers polices for the voluntary insurance of
more than  crops. Moreover, the polices differed in the share of the insured harvest.
 The draft  State Budget does not envisage any allocations for reimbursing insurance payments.
 Pursuant to the law, the procedure is stipulated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
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smallholders will not take advantage of
this opportunity, since grain prices will
be half the amount of the market price,
while they will not have any new operat,
ing funds to buy out the pledged grain
when the price climbs back up;
 it is unlikely that the state will be able to
actively use intervention grain purchas,
es, since they demand far more substan,
tial budget funds than pledged ones
(plus, this mechanism can only work if
the intervention price of grain purcha,
ses is higher than the market one).
Protection of the rights
to crop varieties
The selection, planting, and reproduction
of new sorts of agricultural crops is an impor,
tant factor in increasing the efficiency of agri,
culture and its sustainable development. One
of the areas of government activity stipulated
in the Law of Ukraine “On promoting the
development of agriculture in –”
envisages measures aimed at supporting sci,
entific research in the sector. On  January
, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine passed
a new redaction of the Law of Ukraine “On
protection of the rights to plant varieties”. The
law aims to regulate relations in the sphere
of acquiring rights to plant varieties, their
realisation and protection, and also takes into
account Ukraine’s international obligations,
specifically, those in the International Con,
vention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV—Union internationale pour la
protection des obtentions végétales).
The law defines two types of rights—perso,
nal non,property author’s rights and proper,
ty rights of plant variety owners. Property
rights for varieties are certified with a pa,
tent, and can be subject to pledging and en,
tered into the share fund of legal entities.
Patents are valid for  years for trees, shrub,
bery, and grapes, and  years for varieties
of other plants. Patent owners can grant per,
mission (open license) to other persons, or
either exclusive or non,exclusive licenses
for using varieties; in this case, the levy to
enforce the validity of the variety owner’s
exclusive rights is halved.
The key advantage of the law is that it pro,
vides for the development of the selection
field in Ukraine without applying significant
additional budget funds. However, we be,
lieve that the mechanisms proposed in the
adopted law will not create any extra stimuli
for agricultural selection, due to the follow,
ing circumstances:
 The patent procedure is rather cumber,
some and lengthy. In particular, new va,
rieties of most plants are subject to go,
vernment testing. Thus, registration and
obtaining a patent lasts several years;
 The group of potential payers for using
licensed varieties is small, since those
who grow some varieties in their gardens
for private consumption do not have to
pay the variety owners, and neither do
the owners of subsidiary holdings who
propagate these varieties on an area not
exceeding that which is required to
yield  tons of soft wheat.
Ownership rights of the rural
population
Landownership reform requires the settle,
ment of issues surrounding property rights
over non,land agricultural objects. Ukraine
still does not have any cogent policy on the
 The mechanism of pledged purchases envisages state grain procurements for a certain period at a
certain minimal price, stipulated by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine resolution dated  April 
“On determining pledged prices and financial support for pledged grain purchases” and makes up %
of the price in the agricultural exchange market at the moment of signing of agreements on pledged
procurements.
 In Ukraine, the average wheat yield over – was to . centners per hectare. Thus, the law
exempts smallholders who plant this crop on a territory of up to  hectares from paying compensation
to the owner of the given variety.
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distribution of property formerly belonging
to kolkhozes (Soviet collective agricultural
enterprises), or on the stimulation of effec'
tive property usage. The Decree of the Presi'
dent of Ukraine dated  August  “On
additional measures to increase the level of
protection of property rights of the rural
population” sets benchmarks along which
to develop the legislative base in this area.
Under the decree, within six months of its
promulgation, the Cabinet of Ministers
should undertake measures to implement
the following mechanisms:
 acquisition of property shares by agricul'
tural enterprises for buyout;
 sale of property shares on a competitive
basis;
 exercise by property share owners of
their rights to obtain their shares in kind;
usage of reclamation systems and peren'
nial plantings that belonged to kolkhozes
which were either liquidated or reorga'
nised.
As of  November , the Cabinet of
Ministers did not issue a single document
to implement the above measures, which
means that any changes in ownership rights
over non'land agricultural property will be
unscheduled. The more rapid pace of re'
forms in landownership rights compared to
the analogous reforms concerning objects
located on said land could trigger imbalan'
ces which would undermine any increases
in effectiveness of sectoral functioning.
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Communications
Consumers expect communications operators to provide high*quality services at
non*monopoly prices, which is achievable under conditions of competition.
Concurrently, there are grounds for government intervention, due to: () the
possibility of the dominant operator abusing its monopoly status; and () the
necessity to supply communications services to vulnerable societal subgroups and
inhabitants of remote and hard*to*access territories. Over the research period, a
new draft Law of Ukraine “On telecommunications” was developed, and the Law
of Ukraine “On postal communications” was approved
The government’s policy goal in the com'
munications sphere is to satisfy public de'
mand for quality communications services.
Among the instruments facilitating the at'
tainment of this goal are: () competition,
which should ensure the highest quality in
profitable market segments; and () finan'
cing mechanisms that would guarantee the
delivery of services in loss'making market
segments.
The Law of Ukraine “On communications”
dated  May  has liberalised the com'
munications market in Ukraine. As of  Oc'
tober , pursuant to the law,  licens'
es for local communications were issued, as
well as  long'distance and international
communications, and  cellular licenses. In
addition, the market for Internet services
and IP'telephony rapidly developed.
Nevertheless, the Law of Ukraine “On com'
munications” has failed to resolve the fol'
lowing problems:
 No financing mechanism has been estab'
lished for service delivery in loss'making
market segments, which include the fol'
lowing: () geographically remote and
hard'to'access territories; and () the
poor, people with special needs (pen'
sioners, disabled), etc.;
 Horizontal relations between operators
have not been regulated. Although the law
did regulate relations between operators
and the government (through licensing
procedures), it did not stipulate any de'
tailed norms for the interconnection of op'
erators’ networks, which is the key me'
chanism for ensuring market competition.
Telecommunications
The abovementioned flaws in the Law “On
communications” have had to negative con'
sequences, most  perceptibly in the telecom'
munications sector. For example, the com'
mercial and social functions of the Ukrtele'
kom OJSC national telecommunications
operator were not separated. As in Soviet
times, Ukrtelekom continues to finance the
execution of the state’s social obligations
from its own funds, but receives no compen'
sations from the budget. Specifically,
Ukrtelekom has the following expenditures
in this area:
 Losses from providing telephone servi'
ces in rural administrative regions;
 Losses from connecting privileged
groups of subscribers and from discount
subscriptions of certain consumer
groups. The State Communications
Committee (Derzhkomzviazok) calcu'
lated that the volume of benefits for tele'
communications services declared in
extant legislation totaled  million
hryvnias in , but that State Budget
spending on communications, which
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includes compensation to Ukrtelekom
for the benefits it provided, was execu'
ted to .% of the planned  million
hryvnias;
 Failure of budget'sector institutions to pay
for consumed services, with accumula'
ted debts to Ukrtelekom for communica'
tions services provided in  totaling
. million hryvnias, accounting for
% of the company’s revenues. The big'
gest share of the accounts receivable
(%) was made up of non'payments by
budget'sector institutions.
Combining the commercial and social func'
tions of the Ukrtelekom OJSC warps market
competition, in view of the following circum'
stances:
 Due to the expenditures on social goals,
Ukrtelekom is limited in its possibilities
to invest in network updating, and thus
is incapable of competing with new ope'
rators. Support for the dilapidated ana'
log network requires constant increases
in current expenditures, and thus the
company cannot save money for the de'
velopment of a digital network, which
requires sizable initial investments. In
addition, intensifying competition in the
market for international communications
does not allow to offset losses from the
delivery of local communications servi'
ces by cross'subsidising;
 In order to offset its losses, Ukrtelekom
OJSC is forced to inflate interconnection
fees and restrict network access for pri'
vate operators. Such practices are in'
duced by the lack of interconnection re'
gulations.
If a mechanism for financing social needs is
not created, and relations among operators
are not regulated, this will lead to: () fur'
ther exacerbated conflicts between Ukrtele'
kom and private operators; () sluggish de'
velopment of the telecommunications net'
work; and () slow pace of expansion of tele'
phone penetration. Thus, all market players
should be interested in the adoption of the
new law “On telecommunications”.
The experience of member countries of the
European Union offers the following key
mechanisms for regulating telecommunica'
tions:
 Establishment of a national regulatory
agency, which would, in particular, act
as an independent party in the settle'
ment of disputes between operators;
 Putting in order the tariffs of the domi'
nant operator, in order to ward off abu'
ses of its monopoly status in the market;
 Establishment of a fund for universally
accessible services, from which operators’
losses from the provision said services will
be offset. All operators shall make contri'
butions to this fund, whereas the money
shall be allocated based on tenders;
 Regulation of operators’ interconnec'
tions, in order to guarantee access of
new operators to markets and prevent
socially unproductive investments in
the construction of parallel networks.
Interconnection fees should take into
account the dominant operator’s expen'
ditures on network maintenance, but
should not be discriminatory towards
new operators;
 Introduction of licensing procedures
that would not poise excessive barriers
to market entry.
The Verkhovna Rada registered a draft Law
of Ukraine “On telecommunications”, sub'
mitted by the MPs Yuri Lutsenko and Valeri
Pustovoitenko. This draft law is an attempt
to bring the functioning of the telecommu'
nications sector in Ukraine into line with
European Union directives. Key points of
the draft law are given in Table .
 Interconnection prices are inflated because the Ukrtelekom OJSC sets unjustified requirements for
the construction of network components at operators’ expense, or proposes that operators purchase
options, the price of which equals their construction cost.
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An important innovation of the draft law is
that terms of operators’ network intercon'
nections are brought into line with the
recommendations of the European Union.
However, the success of this innovation will
greatly depend on the development of the
necessary normative acts, particularly the
rules for and mandatory requirements of in'
terconnection agreements.
Despite the above, the draft Law of Ukraine
“On telecommunications” submitted by
Messrs Lutsenko and Pustovoitenko con'
tains significant flaws:
 No procedures or criteria are established
for the approval of decisions of the regu'
latory agency (the National Commission
on Telecommunications Regulation),
which brings a great risk that the regula'
tory agency will be manipulated by par'
ticular interest groups to implement de'
cisions convenient for this group;
 Financing universal access at the cost of
tax benefits to operators providing uni'
versal services will warp competition and
is not in line with tax policy principles.
Firstly, the draft law does not envisage
any bidding procedures for competitive
selection of the operator which will pro'
vide universal services; hence, there is
no mechanism for selecting the most ef'
ficient projects. Thus, the budget will
sustain unproductive losses from extend'
ing the benefits. Secondly, with the lack
of bidding procedures, the benefit sys'
tem will prompt abuses and will become
a way of tax evasion. If the draft law is
passed, the Ukrtelekom OJSC would ac'
tually become the biggest recipient of tax
benefits;
 The proposed draft law places licens'
ing of telecommunications services be'
yond the purview the Law of Ukraine
“On licensing certain types of economic
activity” (see REGULATION OF ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY). In our opinion, a broad list of
types of individual licenses is unjusti'
fied. Firstly, such a complex system
would heap more operating costs upon
communications enterprises. To be able
to start their activity, operators would
have to pay at least twice—for general
permission and for an individual license
to provide certain telecommunications
services. Secondly, licensing the right
to construction on privileged terms
would distort competition and lead to
abuses. Thirdly, obligations to provide
universal services can be stipulated in
agreements between operators and the
regulatory agency, instead of issuing li'
censes;
 The draft law includes many references
to non'existent legislation.
Thus, the submitted draft law does not re'
solve the problem of combining commercial
and social functions. Under this draft,
Ukrtelekom OJSC would be extended tax
benefits, but would have no stimuli to de'
vise and implement a commercial strategy.
Furthermore, the vagueness of norms in the
draft law would create conditions for abuse
and increase providers’ operating expendi'
tures, as well as administration expenditures
by government bodies.
Table . Key points of the draft Law of Ukraine
“On telecommunications”
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Postal communications
Source: International Centre for Policy Studies.
On  October , the Verkhovna Rada adopt'
ed the Law of Ukraine “On postal communi'
cations”. This is a framework law, which sets
forth the overall principles for regulation in
the postal communications sector. Specifical'
ly, the law outlines the powers of executive
government bodies in this field, as well as the
rights and obligations of operators.
An innovation in this law is the introduction
of the concept of universal (universally ac'
cessible) services—namely, postal communi'
cations services of public use at an established
level of quality, offered to all users across the
whole territory of Ukraine at state'regulated
tariffs. The list of universal services is deter'
mined by the Cabinet of Ministers, while tar'
iffs are regulated by the National Commis'
sion for Telecommunications Regulation.
The national operator of postal services is
charged with providing universal services,
while losses are financed from state funds.
On the one hand, the law distinguishes be'
tween the commercial and social functions
of the national postal communications ope'
rator. On the other hand, it does not envisa'
ge any mechanism to stimulate increased
effectiveness of the universal services.
Since the Law of Ukraine “On postal com'
munications” is mostly composed of frame'
work provisions, it does not exert any direct
effect. In order to ensure its implementa'
tion, additional requirements need to be
fulfilled; specifically, the National Commis'
sion for Telecommunications Regulation
should be created, a number of normative
acts should be adopted at the level of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and bud'
get funds should be allocated to offset the
losses of the national operator from provid'
ing universal (universally accessible) servi'
ces.
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